Category Archives: Syria

Thomas Piketty: A Security-Minded Response Isn’t Enough

I’m not sure if it’s exactly kosher for me to provide my own translation of a copyrighted article originally published on a major website in another language, but this is an important piece which I’d like to make available in full to an English speaking audience.

Thus, I give you this recent analysis by French economist Thomas Piketty (who became famous for his 2013 study Capital in the Twenty-First Century) in which he argues that the root causes of ISIS-style extremism can be traced to the unequal distribution of resources in the Middle East. His remedy for jihadism is correspondingly simple: economic opportunity and social justice. These are, perhaps, not new ideas, but he presents them in an exceptionally clear-cut way, not hesitating to point out our own responsibility in the West for maintaining inequality in that part of the world.

The original article can be found in French on Piketty’s blog on the Le Monde website, and there have been several discussions of its contents in the American news media, such as in the Washington Post and in New York magazine. For any flaws in the translation, I take sole responsibility. Take it away, Professor Piketty!

A Security-Minded Response Isn’t Enough
Thomas Piketty in Le Monde, November 22–23, 2015

It’s clear: terrorism nourishes itself on the powder keg of inequality in the Middle East that we have contributed a lot to create. Daesh (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) is a direct product of the decomposition of the Iraqi regime, and more generally of the collapse of the system of borders established in the region in 1920.

After the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990–1991, the coalition powers sent in their troops to return its oil to the emirs — and to Western companies. In the process they inaugurated a new cycle of technological and asymmetric wars — a few hundred deaths in the coalition that “liberated” Kuwait, versus several tens of thousands on the Iraqi side. This logic was pushed to its extreme during the second Iraq war between 2003 and 2001: around 500,000 Iraqi deaths for more than 4000 American soldiers killed, all that to avenge the 3000 deaths of 9/11, which of course had nothing to do with Iraq. This reality, amplified by the extreme asymmetry in human loss and the absence of a political solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, serves today to justify all the abuses perpetrated by the jihadis. Let us hope that France and Russia, on the front lines since the American disaster, will cause fewer casualties and inspire fewer recruits.

Concentration of Resources

Beyond the religious clashes, it is clear that the entire social and political system of the region is overloaded and weakened by the concentration of oil resources in small territories without population. If we examine the zone running from Egypt to Iran by way of Syria, Iraq and the Arab peninsula, with around 300 million inhabitants, we note that the oil monarchies make up between 60% and 70% of the regional GDP for barely 10% of the population, making it in fact the most unequal region on the planet.

We must further point out that a minority of the inhabitants of the oil monarchies keep for themselves a disproportionate part of the wealth, while large groups (notably women and immigrant workers) are kept in semi-slavery. And these are the regimes that are supported militarily and politically by the Western powers, who are all too happy to get back a few crumbs for financing their soccer clubs, or for selling them weapons. It is not surprising that our lessons of democracy and social justice carry little weight among Middle Eastern youth.

To gain in credibility, we would need to show these populations that we care more for the social development and political integration of the region than for our finacial interests and our relations with the reigning families.

Denial of Democracy

In concrete terms, the oil money must go in priority to regional development. In 2015, the total budget available to the Egyptian authorities for financing the entire educational system of that country of nearly 90 million inhabitants was less than 10 billion dollars (9.4 billion euros). A few hundred kilometers away, oil revenues reach 300 billion dollars for Saudi Arabia and its 30 million inhabitants, and exceed 100 billion dollars for Qatar and its 300,000 Qataris. A development model so unequal can only lead to catastrophe. Condoning this is criminal.

When it comes to lofty rhetoric on democracy and elections, we must stop engaging in it merely when the results suit us. In 2012 in Egypt, Mohamed Morsi was elected president in a fair election, something which is hardly typical in Arab electoral history. By 2013, he was expelled from power by the military, which soon enough executed thousands of Muslim Brothers, whose social work at least served to fill in some of the gaps left by the Egyptian state. A few months later, France set that aside so as to sell its frigates and capture a part of that country’s meager public resources. Let us hope that this denial of democracy will not have the same morbid consequences as the interruption of the electoral process in Algeria in 1992.

The question remains: how is it that young people who grew up in France can confuse Baghdad with the Parisian suburbs, seeking to import conflicts here that are taking place there? Nothing can excuse this macho, bloody and pathetic turn of events. Nevertheless, let us note that unemployment and professional discrimination in hiring (particularly massive for those who checked all the right boxes in terms of diploma, experience, etc., as recent studies have shown; see also here) don’t help. Europe, which before the financial crisis managed to take in a net migratory flow of 1 million people a year, with unemployment decreasing must relaunch its model of immigration and job creation. It is austerity that has led to the rise of national egoisms and identity tensions. It is through equitable social development that hate will be defeated.

Get the UN Involved to Fix Syria

If anyone is interested in a serious answer to what we should be doing about ISIS and Syria:

We need to get the UN involved. In the past that would have been a problem because Assad’s sponsor Russia would veto any proposal from the US/France/Britain, but now that Russia has stepped in directly and paid the price (the recent bombing of a civilian Russian airliner over Egypt), they may be willing to seek a coordinated solution with other interested parties. And ALL nations in the region are interested parties. None of Syria’s neighbors wants ISIS’ influence to spread — not Iran (which has been fighting them all along), not Turkey, not Lebanon (where Beirut was bombed just a few days ago), not Jordan, not Iraq (which has its own ISIS probem), not Egypt, not Saudi Arabia or the Gulf Arabs. If there was ever a chance for Russia, the US, the EU, and all the Middle Eastern regional powers to unite on one thing, it’s getting rid of ISIS. Of course from there, interests diverge drastically — but perhaps we can all agree to act on the thing we agree on.

What’s needed are the following:

  • A no-fly zone to keep Assad from barrel bombing his own countrymen, under UN auspices. The exception being that UN forces (which might include Russia, NATO, the US, or Arab nations) would be authorized to attack ISIS from the air in a way designed to protect civilians from ISIS incursions. The model would be the air campaign in Libya against Qaddafi’s forces.
  • Safe zones on Syrian territory to provide humanitarian aid and shelter to refugees fleeing active conflict. These safe zones would be protected by UN peacekeepers (“boots on the ground”) provided by neutral nations.
  • All other forces (pro- and anti-Assad) agree to a ceasefire among each other and a political process, so as unite their efforts against ISIS. The ceasefire would lead to a new constitution, the replacement of Assad with a provisional government, and eventually, free elections open to all parties that renounce violence. The Assad mafia state would need to be dismantled, and this could be done under UN supervision over a period of 2-3 years. To appease Russia they would need to have rights to their naval base guaranteed under the new system. Turkey and the Kurds would need to reach some mutually beneficial agreement regarding control of the common border. Iran and others also have interests they would want protected, so all these parties need to be part of the settlement. But the common goal remains: Assad cedes power and all efforts are concentrated against ISIS.

One possible mechanism for accomplishing all this would be to expel Syria temporarily from the UN with a vote of the Security Council, and place them under the protection of a neutral nation under UN auspices, as outlined in the UN Charter and described here.

The UN actually has substantial powers that are never used because the Big 5 can never agree. But remember that the Korean War was fought under the UN flag. And if the humanitarian crisis in Syria and ISIS’ menace to regional security don’t provide an urgent cause for agreement among the world’s powers, I don’t know what ever will. I certainly hope the Obama administration will consider a much more proactive engagement than they have in the past. Of course, any successful engagement will need to employ political courage and diplomatic imagination as much as military muscle. And we will need to work with every single one of Syria’s neighbors, not just the ones we consider our friends.

Sincere?

Today I found myself, not for the first time, arguing with a friend about whether the U.S. under Bush was “sincere” in its desire to bring democracy to the Middle East. My position has always been that many of the people around Bush (people like Paul Wolfowitz), as well as Bush himself, were sincere. However crazy their reasoning may have seemed to us, and however full of hubris it may have been (believing that the U.S. could reshape the world merely by wishing it so) there was a plan to turn the Middle East into a series of democratic states (not just take their oil) in the belief that only free Arabs in control of their destiny could help us to fight Al Qaeda-style terrorism. My friend wasn’t buying any of this, so for documentary proof, I went back to this April 2003 article by Josh Marshall, creator of the political news site TPM, in which he lays out the grand vision neoconservatives had at the time (improbable as it was), in the first days of the war in Iraq. The article made an impression on me then that I never forgot, and I still feel it’s the best piece of political analysis of that decade.

    “In their view, invasion of Iraq was not merely, or even primarily, about getting rid of Saddam Hussein. Nor was it really about weapons of mass destruction…. Rather, the administration sees the invasion as only the first move in a wider effort to reorder the power structure of the entire Middle East. Prior to the war, the president himself never quite said this openly. But hawkish neoconservatives within his administration gave strong hints. … Late last month, The Weekly Standard‘s Jeffrey Bell reported that the administration has in mind a ‘world war between the United States and a political wing of Islamic fundamentalism…a war of such reach and magnitude [that] the invasion of Iraq, or the capture of top al Qaeda commanders, should be seen as tactical events in a series of moves and countermoves stretching well into the future.’ In short, the administration is trying to roll the table — to use U.S. military force, or the threat of it, to reform or topple virtually every regime in the region, from foes like Syria to friends like Egypt, on the theory that it is the undemocratic nature of these regimes that ultimately breeds terrorism. … Each crisis will draw U.S. forces further into the region and each countermove in turn will create problems that can only be fixed by still further American involvement, until democratic governments — or, failing that, U.S. troops — rule the entire Middle East. …
    “[According to neoconservatives] the Middle East today is like the Soviet Union 30 years ago. Politically warped fundamentalism is the contemporary equivalent of communism or fascism. Terrorists with potential access to weapons of mass destruction are like an arsenal pointed at the United States. The primary cause of all this danger is the Arab world’s endemic despotism, corruption, poverty, and economic stagnation. Repressive regimes channel dissent into the mosques, where the hopeless and disenfranchised are taught a brand of Islam that combines anti-modernism, anti-Americanism, and a worship of violence that borders on nihilism. Unable to overthrow their own authoritarian rulers, the citizenry turns its fury against the foreign power that funds and supports these corrupt regimes to maintain stability and access to oil: the United States. … Trying to ‘manage’ this dysfunctional Islamic world…is as foolish, unproductive, and dangerous as détente was with the Soviets, the hawks believe. Nor is it necessary, given the unparalleled power of the American military. Using that power to confront Soviet communism led to the demise of that totalitarianism and the establishment of democratic (or at least non-threatening) regimes from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait. Why not use that same power to upend the entire corrupt Middle East edifice and bring liberty, democracy, and the rule of law to the Arab world?
    “The hawks’ grand plan differs depending on whom you speak to, but the basic outline runs like this: The United States establishes a reasonably democratic, pro-Western government in Iraq — assume it falls somewhere between Turkey and Jordan on the spectrum of democracy and the rule of law. Not perfect, representative democracy, certainly, but a system infinitely preferable to Saddam’s. The example of a democratic Iraq will radically change the political dynamics of the Middle East. When Palestinians see average Iraqis beginning to enjoy real freedom and economic opportunity, they’ll want the same themselves. With that happy prospect on one hand and implacable United States will on the other, they’ll demand that the Palestinian Authority reform politically and negotiate with Israel. That in turn will lead to a real peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians. A democratic Iraq will also hasten the fall of the fundamentalist Shi’a mullahs in Iran, whose citizens are gradually adopting anti-fanatic, pro-Western sympathies. A democratized Iran would create a string of democratic, pro-Western governments (Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) stretching across the historical heartland of Islam. … Syria would be no more than a pale reminder of the bad old days. (If they made trouble, a U.S. invasion would take care of them, too.) And to the tiny Gulf emirates making hesitant steps toward democratization, the corrupt regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt would no longer look like examples of stability and strength in a benighted region, but holdouts against the democratic tide. Once the dust settles, we could decide whether to ignore them as harmless throwbacks to the bad old days or deal with them, too. We’d be in a much stronger position to do so since we’d no longer require their friendship to help us manage ugly regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
    “The audacious nature of the neocons’ plan makes it easy to criticize but strangely difficult to dismiss outright. … You can hear yourself saying, ‘That plan’s just crazy enough to work.'”

I should note that the article is titled “Practice to Deceive,” so doesn’t that undermine my claim that the Bush administration was sincere? But the article doesn’t claim that their desire to democratize the Middle East was insincere. To the contrary, the duplicity referred to is of the opposite variety — they were claiming to the American people that their plan was far narrower in scope, dedicated only to ensuring that Iraq was free of chemical and biological weapons. Only after American troops were engaged would the full dimensions of the plan become clear, and the American people realize that we were committed to a region-wide project of twenty years’ duration. By then we would have no other choice but to swallow our doubts about democratization and nation-building, and see things through.

Of course, none of this turned out quite as the neoconservatives imagined it then. The Palestinians, for example, saw nothing worth imitating in the fate of their Iraqi brothers. And where democratic elections did occur, the people stubbornly refused to vote for the sort of people the Bush administration had in mind (like Ahmed Chelabi), choosing instead pro-Iranian Shi’a conservatives in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliamentary elections of 2005, and Hamas in Palestine in 2006. Eventually, the Bush administration grew considerably less sincere in its desire for democracy in the Middle East, and backed away almost entirely from the original plan. A few neoconservatives (not many) even apologized to us for their naive and deceptive advice. But still, it helps from time to time to go back to this original snapshot of Josh Marshall’s, and remind ourselves of the kind of imperial hubris that was in the air then.

For Obama’s New Term, Cascading Crises

President Obama has only been reelected for one week, and already the U.S. and the world seem to be hit with a series of cascading crises, real and manufactured: the “fiscal cliff” budget negotiations in Washington; the Petraeus scandal; ongoing controversy over Benghazi; the recognition of the Syrian opposition by France, Turkey, and the Gulf States; signs of revolution in Jordan; unrest across southern Europe regarding austerity; and what looks like will soon be a new land war in Gaza. It’s as if the world held its collective breath until after the American elections, and is now vomiting all its accumulated bile at once.

The “fiscal cliff” is a manufactured problem, in the sense that it can be solved as soon as Obama can agree with Republican members of Congress on a plan to reduce the federal deficit, most likely through a combination of increased revenues (higher tax rates or lower deduction limits for the top 2%), tweaks to Social Security and Medicare, and trimming of domestic programs. Progressives insist there is no reason to cut the deficit for now, and technically they are right, because world markets are eager to buy U.S. Treasuries and fund our further debt. However, there is a limit to what the market will bear, as seen in Greece, Spain, Italy, and even France, which are all being forced into austerity precisely because the markets are unwilling to finance further spending. Nor do we want to end up like Japan, which has no problem with the markets but has carried debt equal to 200% of GDP for the better part of tweo decades, putting a brake on its economy. Careful debt trimming doesn’t seem like a bad idea to me, as a cautionary measure for the future. The trick will be to make most of the burden fall on the wealthy who have benefitted enormously over the past ten years, and are still benefiting despite the crisis, while preserving support for working families and small businesses that are essential to our fragile recovery. I have hope that common sense will prevail, and a reasonable compromise will be found over the coming weeks.

The Petraeus scandal — in which CIA director David Petraeus was caught in an affair with his biographer, Paula Broadwell, when Broadwell sent threatening emails to another woman, Jill Kelley, whom she saw as a rival — provides a fascinating glimpse into how politics at the top level in Washington is deeply personal. Critics of the CIA-run drone warfare program, and the related militarization of the CIA, have rightly questioned why these aren’t the real scandal, rather than a personal dalliance that should have concerned no one but the parties involved. True, but people forget that for better or worse, Washington is a tightly knit social circle of highly ambitious people drawn by the taste of power. With elected officials, political appointees, military officers, lobbyists, and pundits switching roles as they climb the ladder of influence, there is much opportunity for intrigue, and personal relations do affect policy. Some people have asked whether Petraeus really had to resign, but he was the CIA director, and he exposed himself to the possibility of blackmail and manipulation — either from Broadwell herself if she turned vengeful, or from some interested third party who found out. Moreover, and most important in my mind, it seems that he didn’t report the situation to his boss, the Director of National Intelligence, as soon as he realized he was in hot water. Even after being interviewed by the FBI, he apparently said nothing, as if hoping to keep it to himself until it blew over. If I were his boss, James R. Clapper, the first thing I would have asked him after learning what happened is, “Why am I hearing this from the FBI and not from you?” Petraeus showed every sign of putting personal interest above the interests of the institution he was serving, and this would be a firing offense in any company.

The question of what happened in Benghazi seems to be one of those controversies that is ginned up for political advantage. Dark motives are being attributed to the Obama administration for initially blaming the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three others on an angry mob gone out of control, rather than a preplanned attack by an extremist militia. The idea is that the Obama administration ignores terrorist threats or is perhaps even an enabler of them, and is now engaged in a coverup of that fact. This ignores that Ambassador Stevens himself was the person most responsible for assessing his embassy’s security needs, and he chose to take risks so he could meet with local leaders in their own homes, something that won him respect and admiration. Bssides, whether the attack was preplanned or not seems like a matter of semantics, since the Ansar al-Sharia militia was based nearby and its potential for violence was well known. Did they have the September 11 date in mind all along, or did they seize the opportunity of a mob that had gathered to protest the anti-Mohammed film? These are the kinds of details it is impossible to judge without careful investigation — and faced with the need to inform the American public, the administration went with the information it had in the first days after the attack. Those trying to turn this into a scandal seem to have the impression that the administration deliberately leaves its embassies unprotected because of “sensitivities in the region.” This is absurd because the last person interested in risking Stevens’ life was Obama himself, who had chosen this man for the post above all others because of his unique understanding of Libya and his communicative gifts.

Turning from Washington scandals to world affairs, the U.S. has finally succeeded, working behind the scenes with Qatar, France, Turkey, and its other allies in the region, to cajole the Syrian opposition into forming a unified coalition with a reasonable claim to international recognition and support. France has already granted recognition to the Syrian National Coalition as the sole representative of the Syrian people, and it is poised to send them arms and other material aid. Turkey and six Gulf States have also extended recognition. While the U.S. is awaiting further proofs of the group’s legitimacy before going as far as Turkey or France, they are clearly pleased at this latest step, which Hillary Clinton called for a month ago. (When Hillary speaks, the world responds!) I suspect that the next move will be to help the SNC to establish a provisional government within Syria, perhaps with the aid of “humanitarian corridors” to ensure a flow of supplies, from which they will be able to call on the world to protect them against Assad’s aerial attacks. This will lead to either the declaration of a “no-fly zone” and an endgame similar to Libya, or if the Russians resist this, then pressure on the Russians to wash their hands of Assad and ensure a negotiated solution. In either case, NATO, the Arab League, and the U.S. are coming out of the closet in their direct backing of the Syrian opposition — and with that coalition behind them, it will be only a matter of time before the uprising succeeds.

This may seem like smart maneuvering by the Americans, or at least effective management of a situation they neither initiated nor control, but developments in neighboring Jordan cut against American interests in the short term. How many destabilized countries can the Middle East afford at once? Iraq has never returned to a stabilty after it was invaded by George W. Bush; tensions are rising in Lebanon as its many factions take sides in the Syrian confilct; and Egypt’s path to stability remains precarious a year and a half after the fall of Mubarak. Now Jordan, a U.S. ally and one of two Arab nations (along with Egypt) to have a peace treaty with Israel, has experienced three straight days of protests and rioting, aimed not at the puppet government but directly at the king. The trigger for the protests was a rise in the price of gasoline and bottled gas, due to the reduction of subsidies as part of economic reform efforts. Reports state that those protesting aren’t so much members of the organized opposition, but rather the underclass that knows little of politics, but regards their economic future with increasing desperation. Elections are coming soon that the opposition is likely to win, but recent constitutional reforms still leave King Abdullah with near-absolute power. He has already changed prime ministers four times in the past year, leaving himself isolated, with no positive effect on the lives of the people. This is an explosive situation that will be tricky to manage, should a longstanding U.S. ally fall to a popular uprising before the situation is resolved in Syria in favor of the NATO/Gulf alliance.

In Europe, the rolling austerity crisis trundles on with no end in sight. The EU as a whole just went officially into recession, meaning that it has known two consecutive quarters of economic contraction. The Greek parliament passed yet another round of severe austerity measures, guaranteeing the next installment of EU bailout aid, as violent protests occurred outside. Meanwhile, Spain and Portugal underwent a day of general strikes, as labor movements in Italy and elsewhere protested in solidarity. It’s possible that at some point a tipping point will be reached, and the people of southern Europe will decide that the price of economic unity with the more prosperous north is one they are no longer willing to pay. However, until now the politicians have been able to bring the people along with them, almost despite themselves, because everyone knows that the cost of a Euro breakup would be worse than the pain of gritting their teeth, for now, and enduring the attempts to fix the system. My sense is that eventually the crisis will burn itself out and stability will return, at the cost of several years or even a decade of lost economic potential for Europe. The alternative is a direct challenge to the global capitalist order itself. That could be interesting, but it’s not on the horizon for now.

And finally, on top of all that, things are heating up again in Gaza. You will recall that the last time Israel staged a ground invasion there, the result was hundreds of civilians dead (along with a large number of militants), leading to the Goldstone Report accusing Israel of war crimes, and the embarassing American veto of that report at the UN. Now, Israel is poised to do it again — they say they will invade Gaza and personally target any Hamas leader who dares to show his face. Apparently there have been an unusual number of missles landing in Israeli territory lately, and Israel has decided it is time to practice its favorite sport, aggressive deterrence. The first step was the assassination by missile of Ahmed al-Jabari, described in the Western press as Hamas’ top military leader. This was followed by a series of air strikes on missile launching sites in Gaza, and the ground invasion is now days, if not hours, away. President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt, whose Muslim Brotherhood faction shares ideological roots with Hamas, addressed the nation to say, “The Israelis must understand that we do not accept this aggression.” He also recalled his ambassador to Israel, and called on President Obama and the UN to intervene. He later went to Gaza himself on a solidarity visit, perhaps forcing the Israelis to put off their invasion for a day or two. Past experience shows that once the Israelis have made up their minds to do something, no outside pressure will deter them until they themselves decide they are finished. So we are likely to see a week or two of carnage in Gaza, adding yet one more match to the tinderbox in a region where flames are already bursting out all over.

Welcome to your second term, President Obama, and best of luck!

Was Obama Distracted?

Why did President Obama seem tired and off his game during last night’s debate with Mitt Romney? My theory:

    “The Turkish military pounded targets inside Syria on Thursday in retaliation for the mortar attack a day earlier that killed five civilians in Turkey. … The exchanges sent tremors across a region fearful that the mounting violence in Syria would spill into neighboring countries. … The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to which Turkey belongs and whose charter calls in some cases for collective action when one of its members is targeted militarily, met Wednesday night to discuss the crisis. … ‘The conflict in Syria is spilling well over its borders,’ said Andrew Tabler, a Syria analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. ‘I don’t see how the Obama administration continues policy as usual after this.'”

Both Turkey and Syria are saying they don’t want this border incident to spark a larger war, but that doesn’t mean it won’t happen. Just a reminder that being president means being confronted with unpredictable challenges, even on the night of a big debate which could determine your political future. Romney, on the contrary, looked energetic and refreshed. He doesn’t yet have these worries.

Movements Without Leaders

At times, the February 20 Movement in Morocco has been criticized for not having a coherent leadership or a clear set of demands. This gentleman, though he claims to support the movement’s goals, goes so far as to warn that the “pandemonium nature” of the movement could lead to “political and social chaos.”

A few observations from Syria, a far harsher crucible, may provide some encouragement.

    Not having a formal, organised, political opposition that can give voice to the protests was initially frustrating and extremely frightening for many Syrians, yet it was also quite liberating. For one thing it has shown that young and old Syrians are capable of taking control of their own destinies without the stale political opportunists and parties of the past….
    Young popular committees, deep underground in Syria, are liaising and organising among themselves. They are getting their voice to the outside world…and they have learned and adapted remarkably quickly….
    Syrian activists are beginning to find their own voice outside of the anachronistic players that have defined Syrian politics for a generation. As that voice gets stronger, the chance of a fresh new vision for Syria becomes ever more likely.

A movement without a clear leadership may be disconcerting to the authorities in both places, because they aren’t sure who to deal with to contain the dissent. It may also be a sign of broadening popular support. If the demands of either movement could be channeled through a few leaders, it wouldn’t be a popular movement. Conversely, if the demands are coming from the people themselves, there is no way to contain it except to engage the people as a whole.